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Any investigation can have a digital dimension, often involving information from multiple data sources,
organizations and jurisdictions. Existing approaches to representing and exchanging cyber-investigation
information are inadequate, particularly when combining data sources from numerous organizations or
dealing with large amounts of data from various tools. To conduct investigations effectively, there is a
pressing need to harmonize how this information is represented and exchanged. This paper addresses
this need for information exchange and tool interoperability with an open community-developed
speciﬁcation language called Cyber-investigation Analysis Standard Expression (CASE). To further pro-
mote a common structure, CASE aligns with and extends the Uniﬁed Cyber Ontology (UCO) construct,
which provides a format for representing information in all cyber domains. This ontology abstracts
objects and concepts that are not CASE-speciﬁc, so that they can be used across other cyber disciplines
that may extend UCO. This work is a rational evolution of the Digital Forensic Analysis eXpression (DFAX)
for representing digital forensic information and provenance. CASE is more ﬂexible than DFAX and can be
utilized in any context, including criminal, corporate and intelligence. CASE also builds on the Hansken
data model developed and implemented by the Netherlands Forensic Institute (NFI). CASE enables the
fusion of information from different organizations, data sources, and forensic tools to foster more
comprehensive and cohesive analysis. This paper includes illustrative examples of how CASE can be
implemented and used to capture information in a structured form to advance sharing, interoperability
and analysis in cyber-investigations. In addition to capturing technical details and relationships between
objects, CASE provides structure for representing and sharing details about how cyber-information was
handled, transferred, processed, analyzed, and interpreted. CASE also supports data marking for sharing
information at different levels of trust and classiﬁcation, and for protecting sensitive and private infor-
mation. Furthermore, CASE supports the sharing of knowledge related to cyber-investigations, including
distinctive patterns of activity/behavior that are common across cases. This paper features a proof-of-
concept Application Program Interface (API) to facilitate implementation of CASE in tools. Community
members are encouraged to participate in the development and implementation of CASE and UCO.
© 2017 Published by Elsevier Ltd.rsement or recommendation.Introduction
Any investigation can have a digital dimension, often involving
information from multiple data sources, organizations, and juris-
dictions. Whether in court, battleﬁeld or boardroom, decision
makers need to have conﬁdence that the information provided to
them is trustworthy. Cyber-investigations support this need and,
E. Casey et al. / Digital Investigation 22 (2017) 14e45 15in that role, are integrated with other domains, including digital
forensic science, incident response, counter-terrorism, criminal
justice, forensic intelligence and situational awareness. Therefore,
to be effective, cyber-investigation information needs to be rep-
resented and shared in a form that is usable in any of these con-
texts, and is ﬂexible enough to accommodate evolving
requirements.
This paper describes a community-developed speciﬁcation
language called Cyber-investigation Analysis Standard Expression
(CASE), which is intended to serve these needs. The primary
motivation for CASE is interoperability e to advance the exchange
of cyber-investigation information between tools and organiza-
tions (Casey et al., 2017a,b). The power of such a standard is that it
provides a common language and structure to support automated
normalization, combination, correlation, and validation of infor-
mation, which means less time extracting and combining data, and
more time analyzing information. CASE also supports data marking
for sharing information at different levels of trust and classiﬁcation,
and for protecting sensitive and private information (Casey et al.,
2017a,b).
CASE is a rational progression from the foundational work on
Digital Forensic Analysis eXpression (DFAX), which focused on
digital forensic information (Casey et al., 2015).
“When investigating a single incident, being able to combine the
results from multiple tools that are used to extract information
from the digital evidence supports forensic reconstruction,
including timeline creation and link analysis. In addition, being
able to automate the comparison of similar results from multiple
tools facilitates dual-tool veriﬁcation. When crime spans borders,
sharing of information between investigative agencies is crucial for
a successful resolution. A fundamental requirement in digital fo-
rensics is to maintain information about evidence provenance as it
is exchanged and processed, to help establish authenticity and
trustworthiness. Furthermore, without a standardized approach to
representing and sharing digital forensic information, investigators
in different jurisdictions may never know that they are investi-
gating crimes committed by the same criminal.”
(Casey et al., 2015)
DFAX was created to represent and exchange digital forensic
information, using Cyber Observable eXpression (CybOX) to repre-
sent the purely technical information, such as digital traces.
Although intended as a representation for cyber observables inde-
pendent of any particular usage context, the initial development
priority of CybOX focused on supporting cyber-attack pattern
detection and cyber threat intelligence. Because of this, CybOX had
limitations in terms of representing some technical content specif-
ically relevant to digital forensic and cyber-investigation informa-
tion. Since its transfer to the OASIS standards body, CybOX has
become much more closely coupled with STIX (Barnum, 2014)
reducing its utility and ﬂexibility for information representations
other than STIX. In 2016, the independent CybOX was replaced by
STIX Observables as an integrated component of the STIX standard,
which focuses on cyber threat intelligence (Barnum, 2014). STIX
Observables focus on objects relevant to attacks on computer sys-
tems, including executable ﬁles, processes, Registry keys, email
messages, IP addresses, domain names, and URLs. In addition, STIX
Observables are embedded within and dependent on the cyber
threat intelligence context-speciﬁc structure of the STIX schema,
whichdoes not cover related domains such as incident response and
digital forensic science. In short, STIX does not provide a suitable
foundation for representing various cyber-investigation use cases
that require more comprehensive expressivity for a wider range ofdigital traces and their context (e.g., ﬁle systems and smartphone
apps), and that are bolstered by an ontological approach.
CASE is being developed in unison with the Uniﬁed Cyber
Ontology (UCO). Leveraging the lessons learned from CybOX and
DFAX, UCO provides an improved data model and underlying
ontology from which contextually speciﬁc cyber-related represen-
tations can be deﬁned. Enhancements to UCO have been made to
support information representation across multiple cyber domains
(e.g., incident response, digital forensic science, counter-terrorism),
and to facilitate cross-domain exchange of cyber forensic intelli-
gence. CASE, as a speciﬁc proﬁle of UCO, provides support for cyber-
investigations in any context, including criminal, corporate and
intelligence. CASE and relevant portions of UCO build on the
Hansken data model developed and implemented by the
Netherlands Forensic Institute (NFI). Building on the success of its
precursor XIRAF, Hansken provides a robust platform that supports
hundreds of investigations each year. The Hansken data model is a
solid foundation for developing CASE, including most common
traces that are encountered in cyber-investigations, and is ﬂexible
enough to add new types of traces (van Beek et al., 2015).
The novel contributions of this work include:
 Open community-developed speciﬁcation language and
ontology, with a proof-of-concept Application Program Interface
(API) implementation, and examples of how to use CASE to
support information exchange and tool interoperability;
 Alignment of ontology and data structures with existing forensic
systems/tools to facilitate implementation and adoption by tool/
system developers;
 Flexible data model (based on duck typing) that can be easily
extended to represent any cyber-information and its properties;
 Formalized mechanisms to categorize and annotate Traces and
Actions; including tracking forensic activities central to prove-
nance in cyber-investigations;
 Use of JSON-LD as a default serialization to support full struc-
tural and semantic validation of all information in JSON serial-
ized CASE content to the underlying ontological speciﬁcation.
This paper starts with an overview of prior work and the evo-
lution of CASE, and focuses on several use cases, encompassing the
representation and exchange of extracted data and associated
provenance details. An overview is provided of the kinds of infor-
mation that can be represented by CASE, and the role of the un-
derlying UCO is presented. Selection of JSON-LD as the initial
serialization of CASE is explained.
The investigative scenario developed for this paper imagines
The Oresteia by Aeschylus in the age of mobile devices. The purpose
of this scenario is to show how CASE is used to capture information
in cyber-investigations involving multiple related crimes to
advance sharing, interoperability and analysis. A unifying CASE
bundle representing this investigative scenario is provided in
Appendix 2, and portions of the JSON are highlighted within the
paper to illustrate speciﬁc aspects of CASE. The recommended
identiﬁer format is based on UUID, because the global uniqueness
enables relationships to be deﬁned across multiple cases and data
sources. For readability, the examples for this paper use simpliﬁed
labels instead of realistic UUIDs.
Example 1 shows the beginning of a CASE bundle containing
multiple Investigations. Each Investigation contains a list of the
associated elements that are deﬁned in the remainder of the CASE
bundle. To reduce repetitive examples in this paper, not every
person in the scenario is explicitly represented using a complete
Identity object. For illustrative purposes, each object that is refer-
enced in this scenario uses the associated person's name in the
simpliﬁed UUID (e.g. cassandra-device-uuid).
Example 1. Multiple related investigations wrapped in a CASE bundle utilizing JSON-LD serialization.
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develop and implement CASE further.
The purpose of this paper is to provide a foundation for broader
community involvement in deﬁning what to represent and how,
including consumers and producers of cyber-investigation infor-
mation in public and private sector institutions, experienced pro-
fessionals and decision makers, tool developers, and several
currently active information sharing groups, each with a diverse set
of sharing models. Current community involvement includes gov-
ernment and industry, building consensus through collaboration
and implementation. These activities include comparing and vali-
dating CASE and UCO against existing tools and systems to facilitate
implementation and to identify gaps. The CASE repository provides
information about these community activities and design decisions
such as how ﬁle systems and accounts are represented (https://
github.com/casework). The repository also contains more detailed
examples of digital traces and cyber-investigation tool outputs
represented using CASE.
Related work
Schemas proposed in the past focused on discrete subsets of
digital traces and did not encompass the full scope of cyber-
investigation information (Turner, 2005a, 2006; Eaglin and
Craiger, 2005; Lee et al., 2008; Levine and Liberatore, 2009;
Flaglien et al., 2011). Digital Forensics XML (DFXML) is a schema
that is used by several tools to represent ﬁle system information
(Garﬁnkel, 2009, 2012). DFXML primarily represents information
on storage media, and does not cover the broader variety of digital
traces in cyber-investigations. In addition, representation of prov-
enance in DFXML is limited to execution of tools, and does not
encompass the full scope of provenance in cyber-investigations.
The Advanced Forensic Format (AFF4) is used by some tools to
store digital forensic information using the Resource Description
Framework (Schatz, 1995; Cohen et al., 2009). The AFF4 data model
is extremely ﬂexible for storing raw data, and includes built-in
compression and encryption. However, AFF4 does not encompass
the full range of cyber-investigation information that is covered by
CASE and UCO. CASE and AFF4 can be used in unison when data
have been saved in an AFF4 ﬁle. For instance, an investigation
represented using CASE can link to a forensic duplicate of storage
media that was saved in an AFF4 ﬁle.
The XML Data Encoding Speciﬁcation for Intelligence Document
and Media Exploitation (DOMEX) was developed by the U.S. gov-
ernment to share certain types of information, including a limited
set of mobile device details (ODNI, 2016). Although some elements
in the DOMEX standard are used to keep track of provenance, the
lack of supporting ontology, the very limited expressivity for
characterizing cyber observables, and the inability to capture re-
lationships limit the utility and ﬂexibility of this standard.
For the representation of digital traces and their context, CASE
incorporates lessons learned from prior schemas, and builds on the
Hansken data model developed and implemented by the
Netherlands Forensic Institute (NFI). The NFI developed a trace
model to support a digital forensic platform called Hansken (van
Beek et al., 2015). The Hansken data model improves upon an
earlier version called XIRAF (Alink et al., 2006; Bhoedjang et al.,
2012). A Hansken trace consists of a unique id, a (birth) name and
a set of so-called types with properties. The Hansken data model
uses duck typing which allows data to be deﬁned by its inherent
characteristics rather than enforcing strict data typing. A type in the
Hansken trace model can be compared to a predeﬁned Property
Bundle in CASE as illustrated by examples throughout the
remainder of this paper and Appendix 2. CASE objects can be
assigned any rational combination of Property Bundles, such as aﬁle that is an image and a thumbnail. When employing this
approach, data types are evaluated with the duck test, which uses
inference to the best explanation. Simply stated, if it walks like a
duck, swims like a duck, quacks like a duck, and looks like a duck,
then it probably is a duck. This ﬂexible approach is favored over
using the OWL concept of inheritance to deﬁne an object with
various properties. Using inheritance requires permitted properties
to be formally deﬁned for each object type, which becomes un-
wieldy when unexpected combinations of objects are encountered,
such as one type of data embeddedwithin another type of data that
was not imagined when the ontology was designed.
Examples of type in Hansken are ‘ﬁle’, ‘email’ and ‘contact’. A
special type named ‘data’ in Hansken (called ‘ContentData’ in CASE)
exists to deﬁne the properties of the data of the trace, like the
entropy and hash values. Another special type is ‘tool’, which
captures the ‘how’ portion of provenance for the trace. Each type in
Hansken has an origin, deﬁning where the type of the trace comes
from. This origin can be ‘extracted’, ‘mined’, ‘processed’ or ‘user-
added’. Extracted types are deterministic results of applying
forensic tools to data, e.g. ‘ﬁle’ or ‘email’. Mined types such as
‘entity’ are the result of applying probabilistic algorithms. Mined
types have a property to represent the conﬁdence of the trace based
on the probabilistic algorithm it originates from. Processed types
describe the process and provide provenance details, such as the
‘tool’ type. Finally, user-added types describe metadata that is
added by a user while analyzing the traces. CASE supports this full
range of information.
CASE is developed in unison with the Uniﬁed Cyber Ontology
(UCO) to represent in a consistent manner constructs that are
common across a broad range of cyber related domains in order to
support interoperability between these domains.
The Ontology for the Representation of Digital Incidents and
Investigations (ORD2I) referenced UCO, and provided a proof-of-
concept implementation for timeline reconstruction and analysis
(Chabot et al., 2015). Both ORD2I and UCO deﬁne a separate layer
for representing specialized domain knowledge as objects
(Cyberitems in UCO, deﬁned as Traces in CASE) that could be
mapped to a standard representation for sharing and correlating
between organizations and tools. A standardized Traces layer can
be used to represent in-depth knowledge of specialized domains,
and can be shared and maintained across related domains such as
digital forensic science, intrusion investigation, incident response
and cyber threat intelligence. Both UCO and ORD2I provide a
generic way to represent activities involving object and entities,
and also provide a generic way to represent case information
and provenance (called traceability in ORD2I). ORD2I and UCO,
and by extension CASE, represent actions performed by forensic
examiners and investigators when processing the evidence
(ord2i:InvestigativeOperation ¼ case:Forensic Action), such as
keyword searching and decryption, including the tools used
(versions, arguments, etc.). To support provenance, CASE uses
Provenance Records to further characterize Traces with information
speciﬁc to the cyber-investigation domain, such as evidence
number. CASE encompasses all aspects of provenance in cyber-
investigation domains (e.g., collection at crime scene, photo-
graphing evidence, chain of custody documentation), whereas
ORD2I concentrates on provenance in the context of data pro-
cessing using forensic tools. The compatibility between UCO and
ORD2I ontologies reﬂects growing community consensus that has
strengthened the development of UCO and CASE.
There are similarities between UCO and the PROV ontology,
which was developed to represent provenance of data (https://
www.w3.org/TR/prov-overview). It is beneﬁcial to use PROV as a
sounding board while developing UCO. However, the PROV
ontology focuses on producing data, and does not cover several
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not provide the needed functions of an Action in UCO/CASE, such as
the ability to specify inputs, outputs and the instrument that was
used. In addition, the result of an Action in CASE can be another
Action, which is not covered by PROV. Furthermore, PROV does not
have the same ﬂexibility as CASE to represent links and associations
between objects using Relationship objects. As UCO and CASE are
developed, PROV will continue to be a valuable resource for
reference.
Other ontologies and frameworks that have been developed to
enable more sophisticated analysis can implement CASE to sup-
port standardization and interoperability. For instance, the Digi-
tal Evidence Semantic Ontology (DESO) can use CASE to
represent known digital traces and to support triage searches of a
digital crime scene for matching characteristics (Brady et al.,
2015). The Digital Evidence Management Framework (DEMF)
can use CASE to represent metadata and provenance information
(Cosic and Baca, 2015). The ParFor project can use CASE to
represent activities on computer systems (Turnbull and
Randhawab, 2015).
The role of ontologies
“An ontology deﬁnes the basic terms and relations comprising the
vocabulary of a topic area, as well as the rules for combining terms
and relations to deﬁne extensions to the vocabulary.”
(Neches et al., 1991)
“An ontology is a formal, explicit speciﬁcation of a shared
conceptualization.”
(Studer et al., 1998)
The Uniﬁed Cyber Ontology (UCO) provides a rational lattice-
work to buttress CASE, and to build speciﬁcations for other cyber-
domains that follow an orderly and compatible blueprint. Using a
simple analogy, UCO could be thought of as a collection of building
blocks and parts, e.g., big blocks, little blocks, seats, tables, win-
dows, wheels. CASE is a particular build that is comprised of various
components made available by UCO, speciﬁcally suited to a
particular kind of construction. Other domains can use many of the
same building blocks and parts for their distinct purposes.
Information representations can be deﬁned at various levels of
formality, from ad-hoc serialization schemas to explicit models/
ontologies. Serializations are necessary for concrete implementa-
tions of exchange. Basing these serializations on explicit ontology
speciﬁcations offers signiﬁcant advantages, including:
1) Minimized risk of ambiguity and misinterpretation (deﬁne se-
mantics in addition to syntax);
2) Abstraction of concepts and structures for consistency and
reuse;
3) Portability across serializations and technologies (not locked
into a single approach);
4) Integrity of representation is more resilient to evolution and
change.
Modelling the information for a speciﬁc domain at this level
of abstraction and formality can yield clarity both within the
domain itself, and for how the information concepts and struc-
tures for the domain ﬁt within its broader context. For CASE, the
speciﬁc domain of interest is cyber-investigation, and the broader
context includes digital forensic science, computer/networkdefense, incident response, criminal justice, cyber/forensic intel-
ligence, malware analysis, vulnerability research, and offensive/
hack-back operations. The requirements of all these related do-
mains intersect and overlap, which necessitates consistent, ﬂex-
ible and interoperable representations of this information across
each of them. This means that some information concepts and
structures necessary for CASE will also be necessary for other use
cases within the broader ecosystem. For example, the ability to
represent information such as a ﬁle, an email or an action is
necessary not only for cyber-investigation (CASE) but also for
other domains.
Formally modelling as an ontology also provides an explicit
basis for semantic alignment with and mapping to other domain
ontologies. This provides opportunities for automated translation
of instantial content between ontologies as well as the deployment
of such instantial content as linked data enabling querying and
aggregation of distributed content seamlessly across domains
regardless of their native ontology.
Uniﬁed cyber ontology
The blueprint provided by UCO deﬁnes component ontologies
that lay out a proper foundation of fundamental concepts, and that
build out various domain concepts in a way that is explicit while
maintaining consistency and integrity. Foundational concepts are
deﬁned either in the 'uco-core' component or in other components
focused on particular cross-cutting concepts such as Action. Domain
concepts are deﬁned in UCO components focused on the relevant
domains such as Investigation. The current version of UCO has ﬁve
component ontologies with four of them (uco-core, uco-action,
uco-observable & uco-victim) focused on cross-cutting founda-
tional concepts and one (uco-investigation) focused on domain
concepts.
More speciﬁcally, UCO serves multiple domains by providing a
consistent approach to specifying and extending objects, object
identiﬁcation (IDs), meaning and approach to relationships,
approach to data markings, approach and format for expressing
time, approach and structure for actions, approach and structure
for cyber observable objects, as well as approach and structures for
expressing various concepts, including identity, location, roles,
tools, and annotations.
UCO speciﬁes meaning and structure for all of these concepts
once to avoid ambiguity and to minimize issues of conﬂicting
duplication (typically between related domains or use cases),
integrity failure, or inconsistency which can lead to decreased ef-
ﬁciency of automation and higher friction/effort in translation and
integration of content. A uniﬁed representation of these common
concepts facilitates sharing and automation across domain
boundaries.
CASE consists of a selection of elements from UCO relevant for
representing the information of cyber-investigations, including a
universal base Object, Relationship, Action, Investigation (Forensic
Action, Provenance Record), Identities, Roles, and a Property Bundle
extension structure. This extension structure is used by CASE to
represent a range of kinds of Traces and can be easily extended to
cover any cyber item and its properties. Other domains such as
malware analysis, cyber threat intelligence, vulnerability manage-
ment, and security operations could similarly deﬁne standardized
information representations as proﬁles of UCO by leveraging any
appropriate elements such as UCO core concepts (UcoObject/Facet
extension approach, Relationship, Identity, Location, etc.), and
Actions, as well as deﬁning domain-centric components extending
UCO. These new domain-centric components of UCO could then
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relevant.
A non-comprehensive summary of UCO and its use within the
current version of CASE is provided in Appendix 1. Fig. 1 provides
a graphical overview of UCO and CASE elements and how they
semantically relate to each other, with CASE items outlined in
bold.
For ease of understanding and speciﬁcation, UCO is speciﬁed as
a UML conceptual model that is autoderived into a formal Resource
Description Framework/Web Ontology Language RDF/OWL
ontology speciﬁcation (McGuinness and van Harmelen, 2004). RDF/
OWL provides a formally explicit speciﬁcation for the ontology as
well as a rich and extensive ecosystem of technology support for
serialization, transformation, semantic mapping and semantic
querying. Various serialization bindings (JSON, XML, etc.) can then
be speciﬁed against the RDF/OWL ontology speciﬁcation. As dis-
cussed brieﬂy below, the default serialization of JSON-LD provides
explicit continuity and traceability all the way from the formal
ontology to each property of the serialization. This integrated
continuum of top-down and bottom-up speciﬁcation allows im-
plementers and developers to focus on the serialization relevant
to them without having to think about the ontology, while domain
experts and information architects focus on the overallFig. 1. UCO v0.1.0/CASE v0.1.0 Overview. All items shown are elementsontology without worrying about any particular serialization or
implementation.Serialization
Once the overall speciﬁcation and ontology have been created,
there needs to be an implementation of the structure for practical
applications.
These sorts of practical implementations of the information
representation are serialization bindings of the model/ontology/
speciﬁcation to a particular concrete format such as XML, JSON, or
protocol buffers. No single serialization format can be presumed to
be the best answer for all situations. Different technology, envi-
ronment, performance or policy requirements may require
different serialization formats. It is important that CASE and UCO
enables and supports the speciﬁcation and use of different seriali-
zation formats.
To enable community development and vetting of CASE and
UCO, JSON-LD has been selected as the initial default serialization
binding (Lanthaler and Gütl, 2012). JSON-LD is 100% valid JSON
with some speciﬁc JSON structures deﬁned which allow full
structural and semantic validation of each object, array and ﬁeld in
the JSON content to a relevant ontological speciﬁcation for thatof UCO v0.1.0. Items with bold outline are elements of CASE v0.1.0.
Example 2. Properties of an Android device represented using
CASE.
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the ontology and the serialization, and offers signiﬁcant automa-
tion advantages including built-in API support for a range of lan-
guages (python, ruby, PHP, Go, C#, java, etc.) and for lossless
transformation between several serialization formats (JSON-LD,
RDF-XML, Turtle-RDF, etc.).
It is important to understand that this common format is for the
purpose of expressing and exchanging cyber-investigation infor-
mation. The common format is not intended to deﬁne the data
model that individual organizations use to develop their databases
or applications. As such, developers of systems and applications can
translate the common format to their internal implementations.
Furthermore, the JSON serialization is only one form of serializa-
tion, and the common format could be represented in XML, Turtle
(RDF), protocol buffers, or other serializations.CASE Traces and Property Bundles
In the context of cyber-investigations, traces are the fundamental
objects of study. A trace is a vestige, left from a past event or activity,
criminal or not. To represent cyber-investigations, it is necessary to
capture details about speciﬁc traces and their context such as man-
ufacturers and serial numbers of storagemedia, network connection
details, and names of ﬁles stored on a removable USB device with
associated date-time stamps and cryptographic hash values. To
represent this variety of information, as well as other non-trace
cyber-investigation information (identities, locations, tools, etc.),
CASE deﬁnes Objects and potentially associated Property Bundles
containing details about the object. CASE leverages the base
UcoObject type, derivedObject sub-types, andPropertyBundles that
are deﬁned by UCO. Within CASE, a Trace is a special type of object
which captures information commonly encountered in cyber in-
vestigations. Traces include a mobile device, a ﬁle extracted from a
device, an email address extracted from a ﬁle, a location extracted
from EXIF metadata.
Some properties are native to the Object itself, and properties that
represent contextually related characteristics of the Object are rep-
resented using Property Bundles. A Trace can have multiple Property
Bundles (File, Picture, Thumbnail), each with its own set of properties.
A simple example of a Tracewith the Property Bundles that deﬁnes itExample 3. Properties of a File represented using CASE.as an Android device is provided in Example 2. The JSON in this
example is JSON-LD,whichuses strict@typevalues to specify the type
for all JSON objects, enabling their explicit traceability back to the
speciﬁcations for these types in UCO. The @type speciﬁes the prop-
erties that it expects toﬁndusing JSON-LDvalidation. The Trace@type
is a sub-classofObject that isused to characterizedigital “things” such
as devices, ﬁles, URLs, and network connections.Each Object is assigned an identiﬁer (@id) that can be used to
refer to the Object, as discussed in the next section (CASE
references).
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as needed to represent specialized cyber-investigation information.
It is worth noting that, during the development of CASE, an un-
successful attempt was made to represent everything using a single
type of Object (an Item). The ideawas to use Property Bundles for all
properties and to let each Item be deﬁned by the Property Bundles
that were assigned to it, strictly following the duck typing model
implemented in theHansken system(vanBeeket al., 2015). Although
this approach works well for things like Traces that are speciﬁc to a
cyber-investigation,many other things are conceptually distinct, can
be shared across domains, and have value in independent semantic
deﬁnitions. It was determined that different types of Objects were
needed, including Annotations, Identities, Locations, Relationships,
Roles, and Tools as detailed in the UCO Core Entities section below.
CASE references
In general terms, a “reference” is a property of an Object that
cannot be changed (a.k.a. immutable) that points to another Object,
representing a relationship to that other Object. In CASE, such
references are represented using an embedded property that
speciﬁes the @id of another Object. Example 4 shows SMS mes-
sages with reference to accounts that contain phone numbers.Example 4. SMSmessage represented using CASE with references
to Account Traces.
Example 5. A crime scene Location represented using CASE.TheAccountPropertyBundle is used to represent properties of any
type of account. Properties of specialized types of accounts such as a
phone number or an email address, are represented with separate
Property Bundles focused on the speciﬁc account type (e.g. Pho-
neAccount, EmailAccount). Additional examples of accounts repre-
sentedusingCASEareprovided in the “accounts.json”ﬁleonGitHub.2
Another illustrative example of references in an Object being
represented with the Message and Attachment Property Bundles is
provided in the CASE repository within “message.json.”3 In that2 https://github.com/casework/case/blob/master/examples/accounts.json.
3 https://github.com/casework/case/blob/master/examples/message.json.example, Message properties ‘from’ and ‘to’, and Relationship
properties ‘target’ and ‘source’ all reference other Objects. The fact
that these properties are references to other objects is deﬁned in
the underlying ontology. Some properties, if deﬁned in the
ontology, can enforce ordering. CASE utilizes the Ordered List
Ontology as a specialized implementation for ordered arrays within
the current version of UCO. This ordering is demonstrated using the
same example (“message.json” on GitHub) e each referenced Ob-
ject (‘message1’, ‘message2’, ‘message3’) within the ‘messages’
property is listed in a particular order.
UCO core entities
CASE implements UCO to represent certain types of information
that transverse the cyber domain as core entities, including Anno-
tations, Identities, Locations, Relationships, Roles, and Tools. These core
entities are sub-classes of Object, which is an intentional deviation
from the duck test to avoid ambiguity resulting from the implicit
rather than explicit identiﬁcationofwhat concept is beingexpressed.
Explicit characterization of these core entities and objects (based on
the concept being represented) provides semantic clarity, consis-
tency of use across domains and use cases, and facilitates alignment
of CASE and UCO with external ontologies and representations.Example 6. A person Identity represented using CASE.
CASE also leverages cyber-investigation focused Object types
from UCO, including Investigation, Forensic Action, Provenance
Example 7. A Tool represented using CASE.
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following sections.
An open point for community discussion is which existing stan-
dards to utilize for representing core entities such as Identity and
Location. This discussion needs to address what information is
treated as part of Identity versus a Trace, such as an email address.
Account informationextracted fromacomputerormobiledevice can
be linked to an identity, which may be an actual person or ﬁctitious
entity. However, it important to realize that identity information
describes a speciﬁc entity in a given context, during a certain time,
with some level of conﬁdence (Casey and Jaquet-Chiffelle, 2017).
CASE can capture these subtleties of identity information using Re-
lationships and Conﬁdence as detailed in the following sections.Relationships
Capturing the relationships between Objects is important in
cyber-investigations. As a general rule, in CASE, a link between two
Objects should be represented as an independent RelationshipObject
specifying the type of connection (a.k.a. external relationship).
Otherwise, if a related Object represents an inherent and indelible
property within an Object, it should be represented as an identiﬁer
reference within the Object (a.k.a. embedded reference). For
example, when location information is not extracted from a Trace or
is added later, it needs to be representedusing a separateRelationship
object that links theTracewithanassociatedLocationobject as shown
in Example 8. However, when a Trace contains location information
such as longitude and latitude coordinates, these can be represented
using a property with a reference to the associated Location Object.
Example 8. Example of a Relationship represented using CASE,
referring to the Android device in Example 2 above located at the
crime scene represented in Example 5.As shown in Example 9, Relationships in CASE can also be used to
link an individual to a speciﬁc computer or mobile device, and can
representwhat role the person had in the investigation (e.g., victim,
offender, and investigator).
Example 9. Relationshipsdeﬁned inCASE to represent theRole that
a particular person had in the Investigation (Cassandrawas a Victim)
and her associated mobile device (represented in Example 2).
Considerable attention was given to how CASE represents ﬁle
systems, ﬁles, and their contents because these are fundamental
objects in most cyber-investigations and supporting tools. Separate
Property Bundles were deﬁned for FileSystem, File and ContentData.
The link between a FileSystem and File is represented using a
PathRelation relationship, with properties on a “contained-within”
Relationship characterizing where the ﬁle Trace (Relationship.Source)
is located within the enclosing container (Relationship.Target) as
shown in Fig. 2 and represented in Examples 10 and 11.
Example 10. Example of a Relationship represented using CASE,
showing theﬁle system locationof theﬁle represented inExample3.mmssms 
(Example 3) (Example 10) path: 
/data/data/com.android.providers.telephony/mmssms.db
partition 6 (Example 11) subrange: 
234909233 - 120000000000
image
Fig. 2. Schematic example of multiple Relationships in CASE, depicting the sample
JSON in Examples 10 and 11.
Example 11. Example of using Relationship in CASE to represent an EXT3 ﬁle system in a partition within a forensic duplicate.
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data structures, not only ﬁle systems. For instance, CASE can
represent ﬁles within other ﬁles, such as ﬁles in an ISO disk image
ﬁle that is stored on a computer. More extensive documentation
and an illustrative example can be found in the “ﬁles.json” example
on GitHub.4
Another example of representing ﬁles was generated in the
“bulk_extractor_forensic_path.json” on GitHub to show how CASE4 https://github.com/casework/case/blob/master/examples/ﬁle.json.
5 https://github.com/casework/case/blob/master/examples/bulk_extractor_
forensic_path.json.can be used to represent a forensic_path created by the Bulk
Extractor tool based on an example in Garﬁnkel, 2013.5Conﬁdence
UCO, and by extension CASE, includes conﬁdence as a property
of any Object including Relationships. Example 12 shows how the
link between an Identity (e.g., a person) and an Account can be
represented using CASE with the associated conﬁdence.
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using CASE.The conﬁdence property of the Conﬁdence Property Bundle is of
Controlled Vocabulary type, meaning that it can be set to a string
from a deﬁned list. Using this approach, conﬁdence can be set for
any link or inference, including timestamp accuracy, location, ac-
count ownership, investigative assertion, and expert opinion. CASE
supports user-deﬁned representations of conﬁdence. An open
question for community discussion is what vocabulary to use by
default for representing conﬁdence. One approach is to use values
between 0 and 1 to represent conﬁdence, but this does not cover
situations inwhich the conﬁdence is unknown or the information is
known to be incorrect. Another approach is to use the Admiralty
Code Credibility Scale, with the following values: 1 ¼ Conﬁrmed by
other sources, 2 ¼ Probably True, 3 ¼ Possibly True, 4 ¼ Doubtful,
5 ¼ Improbable, 6 ¼ Truth cannot be judged. Whatever approaches
are used to represent conﬁdence, there will be situations in which
the conﬁdence is unknown or known to be unreliable.
Annotations
A ﬂexible Annotation Object in CASE can be associated with any
Object or set of Objects. An Annotation can consist of free text and/
or keywords as shown in Example 13. This provides a mechanism
for labeling and grouping, and also for adding general notes and
comments to Objects or groups of Objects (e.g., bookmarks).
Example 13. Example of an Annotation represented using CASE.Annotations are intended to be ﬂexible enough to represent
bookmarks that encapsulate multiple Objects, and to associate
notes with speciﬁc things. An Annotation can be added by a process
or a person, including the categorization of a Trace as extracted,
mined, processed or user-added.
Future development of CASE and UCO will determine whether
Annotations can be used effectively to represent assertions made by
either a person or tool, or whether a separate object is necessary.
Related to this, ORD2I uses the “isSupportedBy” property to model
the link between an outcome and its input. For instance, isSup-
portedBy can be used to show that new information was deduced
from a speciﬁc Trace, effectively representing how investigators
reached a given conclusion.
Provenance
In any cyber-investigation, it is necessary to capture information
about the origin of a Trace and how it was handled after it was
found, generally referred to as provenance (Turner, 2005a,b; Levine
and Liberatore, 2009; Casey et al., 2015).
In a legal context, the evidence authentication process uses in-
formation about provenance, including evidence collection docu-
mentation, continuity of possession forms (chain of custody), audit
logs from forensic acquisition tools, and integrity records, which all
help establish the trustworthiness of digital traces.
In the context of forensic examination, provenance refers to the
source and extraction method of speciﬁc Traces such as e-mail
messages, attachments, and their associated metadata being
extracted from a Microsoft Outlook PST ﬁle using a speciﬁc soft-
ware application. Analyzing the provenance of a Trace can also be
used to ascertain whether it is forged or the genuine object.
The CASE standard uses Provenance Records to capture contex-
tual and descriptive information about Objects that is speciﬁed by
cyber-investigation/forensic personnel or tools. A simple example
of an Object withmultiple Provenance Records is a single device that
is initially labeled and described by one agency, and later labeled
and described differently by another agency. CASE represents these
labeling occurrences as two forensic actions and associated Prove-
nance Records on the same Device Object. Example 14 shows two
Provenance Records for the same Android smartphone handled and
labeled by two different police departments (see the next section
for discussion of Forensic Actions).
Example 14. Example of a CASE Provenance Records for the
Android device represented in Example 2.
One of the strengths in the Hansken data model is that it dif-
ferentiates between properties that are extracted, mined, pro-
cessed, and annotated. This explicit categorization makes the
meaning and use of Trace properties clearer. To capture this beneﬁt,
CASE uses the Action Lifecycle structure discussed below.
Another beneﬁt of the Hansken data model is that provenance is
baked into the data model using a tree structure. However, the
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does not capture the speciﬁc nature of relationships between dig-
ital objects, which limits the ﬂexibility for representing cyber-
investigation information. The CASE standard uses Forensic Ac-
tions to provide additional ﬂexibility for representing provenance
as described in the next section.
Actions
In addition to the activities to process available data sources,
cyber-investigations involve analysis of offender activities that are
represented within digital data. Any of these activities can be rep-
resented as an Action, which is a core entity sub-class of Object in
CASE. AnAction can be used to represent anyactivity associatedwith
Objects and other Actions, capturing higher-level, human under-
standable portrayals of patterns (a.k.a. artifacts) that enable more
efﬁcient forensic analysis (Hargreaves and Patterson, 2012; Casey
et al., 2015; Brady et al., 2015). Example 15 shows an Action that
represents Traces of ﬁle wiping found on the suspect's computer.
Example 15. Example of the Action of a wiping tool used on the
suspect's computer to overwrite a ﬁle. The original ﬁle name is
unknown (represented as ????.???) and the resulting ﬁlename is
aaaaaaaa.aaa.In addition to representing extracted timestamps as properties,
any activities with an associated timestamp could also be repre-
sented as Actions, which is an interpretation with some associated
conﬁdence, depending on the origin and/or trust in the clock. There
are multiple advantages of representing this information as Actions
rather than extracted data. Although this representation of the data
may not be the same as how it is displayed within an application,
the information is not changed and can be mapped between the
JSON serialization and application speciﬁc representation.
When an Action contains indelible location or performer in-
formation, this can be represented using a property that refer-
ences the associated Object. However, when the location or
performer is not indelible within a Trace or might need to be
updated later, this information must be represented using a
separate Relationship object. For instance, when location details
are part of extracted data, they can be represented via reference.
The indelible quality of a reference is not asserting that the in-
formation is true, just that it is what was represented in the
extracted data. For any situation requiring interpretation or po-
tential future revision of location or performer, the information
should be represented with a Relationship, with some level of
conﬁdence.
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Cyber-investigations require traceability and chain of evidence.
Forensic Actions provide the backbone for provenance information,
or audit trail, maintaining a chain of all evidence handling and
processing activities. To maintain information about how evidence
is exchanged and processed, each action that is performed on an
Object is represented using a Forensic Action as shown in Example
16, including information about who (performer or tool) did what
(a verb such as seized, imaged, executed), when, and how. This
illustrative example captures activities to preserve a CCTV
recording of a rape, generating an associated Provenance Record.
Further processing of the CCTV recording such as enhancement or
facial comparison can be represented by Forensic Actions, using the
Provenance Record as the input object in order to keep track of each
step in the provenance.Example 16. Example of a Forensic Action and Provenance Record.Authorizations for cyber-investigations such as legal authori-
zations (search warrant, etc.) are represented in CASE as Traces,
which are referenced within Forensic Actions as shown in bold in
Example 16 above. This approach allows a single authorization tobe referenced from multiple Forensic Actions without duplicating
the information.
The environment in which the Forensic Action occurred can be
represented, whether it be a computer system (forensic tool
running on a laptop running Chrome), or a physical location
(photographing evidence in a bathroom at the crime scene).
The role of the performer can be speciﬁed within each Forensic
Action, allowing one person to have multiple roles throughout the
forensic lifecycle: a ﬁrst responder during the preservation phase, a
forensic examiner during the examination phase, and an expert
witness during the presentation phase.
As a general rule, Forensic Actions do not reference Objects
directly, but rather reference Provenance Records when available in
order to maintain provenance information. The exception to this
general rule is the special case of a Forensic Action on the original
Object being handled for the ﬁrst time, such as when it is seized at acrime scene as shown in Example 16 above. In addition, a Forensic
Action can output other Forensic Actions, such as when an auto-
mated tool launches modules to process Objects as shown in
Example 17.
Example 17. Example of one forensic tool spawning a subprocess, represented using CASE as a Forensic Action that results in another
Forensic Action.
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All activities that can be represented using Actions can be
categorized within any predeﬁned Action Lifecycle, whether the
lifecycle relates to activities performed by offenders, victims, or
cyber-investigators such as chain of custody, data extraction, cor-
relation to generate a timeline, semantic reasoning, etc. (Casey
et al., 2015).
The Action Lifecycle construct in CASE can be adapted to
distinguish between Forensic Actions performed during various
phases of a cyber-investigation. Each Forensic Action can be
categorized according to the phase(s) of a Forensic Action Lifecycle
that represents steps in the forensic process in order to provide
context for each action as shown in the “forensic_lifecycle.json”
example on GitHub. For instance, one organization could
describe the steps of the forensic process as documentation,
preservation, examination, analysis, and presentation. Another
organization could describe the steps of the forensic process
differently, but still use the Forensic Action Lifecycle structure and
categorize each Forensic Action accordingly. In ORD2I, the
Extraction, Settlement, Enhancement, and Analysis phases of
Semantic Analysis of Digital Forensic Cases (SADFC) can be rep-
resented in CASE as an Action Lifecycle. In addition to providing
context for each Forensic Action, this categorization can be useful
for gathering insight into what tools were used or results were
produced in different phases of the forensic process to determine
preference and trends.
This type of information can be used to address various ques-
tions such as how much time was taken by each phase of an
investigation, determining which tools are most useful for a given
phase, and isolating which results were generated at different
phases.
A signiﬁcant difference between CASE/UCO and ORD2I is the
distinction between actions performed by victims or offenders,
such as evidence destruction or concealment. Extending UCO
core objects, CASE captures actions carried out by offenders,
victims, or other people involved in a cyber-investigation. This
approach supports analysis from a cyber-investigation perspec-
tive (who did what in a crime or cyberattack) such as whether aExample 18. Using the proof-of-concept API to serialize in JSON or XML“Webpage Visit” event/action was performed by the victim or
offender.
The Action Lifecycle can also be used to categorize criminal
activities, such as a terrorist planning an attack, a sexual preda-
tor's grooming of victims, or a network intruder's method of
operation, e.g., kill chain phases. This generalized approach can be
used to classify each action in a case, which provides context to
understand cyber-investigation activities, including studying spe-
ciﬁc categories of activities, or develop statistics about what
tools are used in different phases of a cyber-investigation. Action
Lifecycle and Action Patterns in CASE can support future work in
pattern matching and higher level event composition (Casey et al.,
2015).
Proof-of concept API
Members of the community are developing an Application
Program Interface (API) to facilitate implementation of CASE in
tools. A proof-of-concept API that exports some objects to CASE
(https://github.com/casework/case-api-python). This proof-of-
concept was written in python and uses the library rdﬂib as a
backend for constructing the graph. This simple API demonstrates
how to use an existing RDF library and a small wrapper to serialize
data in CASE, producing output in JSON and XML.
The API allows developers to quickly populate and serialize an
RDF graph following the CASE structure. To use this API, imple-
menters must understand which structures to create on the basis
of the CASE rule set, such as creating Relationships to link related
ﬁles. It is also necessary for implementers to know which prop-
erties are allowed within each UcoObject and PropertyBundle
type.
To demonstrate its use, the API was implemented using plaso
and includes JSON and XML output (see examples https://github.
com/casework/case-implementation-plaso). The plaso to CASE
exporter was implemented using the proof-of-concept API to map
event objects and path speciﬁcations created by plaso's log2time-
line tool into one or more CASE UcoObjects. Example 18 shows how
the API can be used to generate a simple representation of a blob
extracted from a SQLite database.the CASE representation of a blob extracted from a SQLite database.
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checking it against the current OWL ontology and generating a
warning if any discrepancies are detected. In addition, a higher-
level API could be created to help enforce the CASE rule set,
properties, and expected data types without the need for
validation.Conclusions
The community-developed speciﬁcation language (CASE), and
the underlying ontology (UCO) described in this paper, support
standardized representation and exchange of cyber-investigation
information between tools, organizations, and jurisdictions. In
addition to advancing interoperability and interconnectivity, CASE
and UCO provide a common language and structure that can sup-
port automated normalization, combination correlation and vali-
dation of information, which means less time extracting and
combining data, and more time analyzing information.
Codifying and sharing information in a standardized form en-
ables digital investigators to search for similar patterns in their
cases. Finding similar patterns between cases can support reuse of
previously effective solutions, such as forensic analysis methods for
proving that wiping occurred and possibly recovering remnants of
overwritten ﬁles, thus reducing duplication of effort and increasing
consistency of forensic analysis (Casey, 2013). Furthermore,
searching for speciﬁc patterns across cases can potentially reveal
links between related crimes.
Standardized representation of Traces can also be useful for
application footprinting by recording all traces of a given Action
(e.g., install, execute, uninstall). For example, the NIST Diskprint
project is expanding the National Software Reference Library
(NSRL) metadata reference set by recording changes made to a
system by an application over its lifecycle (http://www.nsrl.nist.
gov/diskprint/). As a way of communicating these changes,
NIST outputs the ﬁle metadata in multiple serialized formats.
Sharing this kind of software Diskprint information is apowerful means of facilitating digital forensic analysis and tool
development.
The current version of CASE has been released for broader
community use and development (https://github.com/casework)
along with the supporting UCO. The ongoing development work
includes validating CASE and UCO by implementing it in existing
tools and systems used to support cyber-investigations, and adding
new properties as needed.
All members of the community are invited to be involved in
further enhancements and applications of CASE, including public
and private sector institutions, experienced professionals, and
tool developers. Being involved at this early stage of design and
development is an opportunity to make sure that the standard
can support speciﬁc use cases. Open questions include the de-
cision of what existing standard to use for representing Loca-
tions (e.g., KML) and representing Identities (e.g., CIQ, NIEM).
The community is currently reﬁning how CASE represents
combinations of entities and traces, such as contact details
stored in an address book on a computer or mobile device. The
community is also considering a consistent way to represent lists
stored in different applications, such as Todo lists, Note lists,
Reminders lists, Task lists, and possibly Calendar entries. Related
to this, the community needs to decide the preferred way to
represent an ordered list that will be compatible with different
formats (Drummond et al., 2006). Future work can extend CASE
to represent similarity digests, language translation, and
behavior patterns.Acknowledgements
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Appendix 1. UCO v0.1.0/CASE v0.1.0 class summary.
Each of the classes identiﬁed in the table speciﬁes appropriate properties for its characterization. For the sake of brevity, these properties
are not presented here, but are documented on the UCO GitHub repository.
UCO v0.1.0 Description CASE v0.1.0
uco-core
UcoObject A cyber-relevant concept. This is the base object deﬁning the minimal core set of properties
to act as a consistent, unifying and interoperable foundation for all explicit and interrelated
content objects within the Uniﬁed Cyber Ontology (UCO).
N/A (leveraged indirectly
through subclasses)
Facet A grouping of properties characterizing a particular aspect/facet of an object. PropertyBundle (simple rename)
Relationship An association or link between two uco objects. Relationship
Identity Characterization of the identifying properties of an individual or organization. Numerous
facets deﬁned.
Identity
Role Usual or customary function based on contextual perspective (e.g., Investigator, Attorney,
Offender). Multiple general sub-roles also deﬁned, including Victim.
Role
Location A geophysical place, site or position. Numerous facets deﬁned. Location
Tool Characteristics of a tool used in a cyber context potentially including its usage environment
and conﬁguration characteristics. Multiple general sub-classes of tool also deﬁned.
Tool
Compilation A grouping of things. N/A
Bundle (Compilation) A contained compilation of UCO content with no presumption of shared context. Bundle
Grouping (Compilation) A compilation of referenced UCO content with a shared context. Grouping
MarkingDeﬁnition Represents a speciﬁc marking that may be applied to UCO data. MarkingDeﬁnition
GranularMarking Marking deﬁnitions to be applied to particular portions of a particular UCO object. GranularMarking
Time Consistent formats for conveying time and date. Time
Assertion A statement asserted to be true. N/A
Annotation A statement asserted to be true in relation to one or more other objects. Annotation
ExternalReference Characteristics of a reference to a resource outside of UCO. N/A
uco-action Description CASE v0.1.0
Action Something that may be done or performed. Numerous facets deﬁned. Action
ActionLifecycle An action pattern consisting of an ordered set of multiple actions or sub action-lifecycles. ActionLifecycle
ActionPattern A logical pattern of characteristic action property values. N/A
uco-observable
CyberAction Something that may be done or performed within the digital domain. N/A (leverages the general
Action object)
CyberItem A distinct article or unit within the digital domain. Numerous facets deﬁned for various cyber
item types.
Trace (simple rename)
CyberRelationship An association or link between two cyber observable objects. N/A (leverages the general
Relationship object)
CyberObservablePattern A logical pattern composed of cyberitem and cyberaction properties. N/A
uco-investigation Description
Investigation An exploration of the facts involved in a cyber-relevant set of suspicious activity. Investigation
ForensicAction An action taken as part of forensic handling or processing to support a cyber investigation. ForensicAction
ProvenanceRecord A provenantial connection between a forensic action and a set of observations (items
and/or actions) or interpretations that result from it.
ProvenanceRecord
Authorization (Facet) Identiﬁes some form of authorization for investigatory action, such as a court order. Authorization
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